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In the Supreme Court of the
State of

Utah

GENEVA LUMBER COMPANY,
Appellant~

vs.
PAYNE AND
oorptJration ~

DAY~ INC.~

a.

CASE
NO. 0075

Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEliENT OF FACTS

This case arose out of a series of contracts whereby
appellant rmdertook to provide ce~in building ·materials
to re9p0lldent in construction of sixty~one ~houses in Orem
and Provop Utah. (Exhibits 6 to 11). An exam-ination of
th-ese exhibits shows that under these contracts appellant
was to provide certain specified amounts of named mate.
rialsr They were not -contracts to provide an the materials
necessary for the cons truc"tion of the3e houses~
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All contracts contain the following or similar provision: '•It ls mutually agreed that any additions or deletions in the materials to be furnished axe to be given in
writing by party of the second part (respondent) to party
of the first part {appellant} and the value of the changeJ
based upon prices quoted in the attached listj shall either
be added or subtracted from the original contract.n
This action was brought· to recover for materials not
t

named in the contract but delivered

to the projects, and

for amOWlts of materials deli:vered in excess of q~tities
named in those contracts. For convenience throughoot the
trial of the case those items delivered but not named in the
contract were referred to as uext:ras"'l' and those items
named in tfle contract, ~but for which the awellant. claims
an excess over and alxlve the amounts thus named was delivered are called 't overagesH. Ttrls designation is follO"Wed
here~
It is agreed that none of tb~ extras or overages
were orden:xl in writing by: respondent. Appellant's throry
is that this provision contained in these ron tracts \\Tas ei1her
waivedt modified, or that the defendant is estopped to as-

sert such defense.
When the appeJlant rested, the respondent moved to
disrrtiss (R.. 26~ Tr+ 478).. The trial court granted the mo.
tion and entered an order of dismissal. This appeal is taken
from that order .

It is observed that in entering that order, the trial court
did not make findings of fact and conclusions of law as
provided by Rule 41 (b). U~ R C. P. \''e believe the rule
in thi .s jurisdiction to be that~ in ruling upon a motion for
nonsuit at the end of plain tiff's case and in review-ing the
granting of such motion. the trial court and appellate court
wi II assume that aJJ facts and 1egitlmate jnferences that
t

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

can be deduced therefrom arising from plaintiffs evidence
\Vill be taken as true. 1\olartin v. stevens,
Utah
-~' 243 P. 2d 747; \Villiam v. Z. C~ M. L, 6 Utah 2d
283, 312 P . 2d 564; Winchester v. Egan Farm Servioo,. Inc.,
4 Utah 2d 129, 288 P. 2d 79(1.. We present our facts in light
of that rule~
Appellant first engaged in transactions \vith respondent~ through its agent, Mr. C. E~ Slavens~ in Januaryf 1957
(Tr. 283). At that time Mr. Davis, through negotiations
Vlith Mr. Slavens, submitted bids for providing materials
for construction of the first series of houses involved in this
action (Tr+ 284ff). Through these ·bids, the parties entered
mto a contract for the appellant to ·provide the •materials
named in the contract, at the prices therein specified (Exh~
6). Subsequently through the spring and summer of 1957,
the parties entered into ft. ve additional contracts similar
in form, to provide materials for a total o£ sixty-one houses

(Exh.'s 7 to 11).
Early in the course of performance of the contracts
appellant learned that more and different materials were
being ordered and delivered than called for in the contract
(Tr. 80) ~ He took this up with responde-nt's superintendent,

and wa.s assured that the latter would take this up with
!\lr. Payne or Mr. Day, the Hpowersn in the corporate re-spondent, and that unless appellant heard otherwise, writ·
te-n orders would not be necessary (Tr. 299). He did not
hear otherv.rise. Respondentts superintendent even joined
in setting up the manner of keeping track of the extras and
overages (Tr+ 353).
Appellant ·began to bill responde-nt for these extras
and overages~ but the billing v..·ac:; returned by respo·nden t's
superintendentt with the exhortation that this shouJd not
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be donet as it confused the corporate officers, but that the
partiet; should keep track of such extras and overages, and
that appellant and respondent's superintendent would get
together at the end _of the projects and settle up (Tr.. 351. .
354)

I

Accordingly~

at the end of construction appellant de-

termined he was owed $7:r751.79 for these overages and
extras, billed the respondent therefor, but was refused any
payment at all (Tr. 356-357). This action tvas brought

.to recover such -sum.
. As. stated~ there were no findings of fact or conclu·sions of law, although these were not 'vaived. The issues
therefore~

be determined from the course of the trial
Because this is an appeal from a non-suit, we believe it
mu·st be taken as fact that materials to the value stated,
not included in the contracts!' were delivered to respcndent
and were not paid forl' and that they were delivered at the
instance of the superintendent of the respondent ..
.l!pon the trial it was ·urged frequently ~ vehemently
that no evidence could be admitted of the deliveries of overages -and extras because this vio1ated the parole evidence
rule. It \Vas urged further that the parole evidence rule
precluded such evidence because of what counsel denominated the '~package methodt' of bil1ing on orders such as

must,.

here involved. Counsel for respondent apparently takes
the view that under these contracts a:ppeilant w~L~ to provide all materials required for the houses and therefore
he could not introduce such evidence because it varied the
terms of the contract.
Respondent further took the view that Mr~ C. E. Slavens!' corporate superintendent, had no authority to waive
any provision~ alter, or amend the written contracts.. It
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\Vas further urged that in vie\\' of the fact that lien waivers
had been signed by the appellant~ he could not now assert
claim for any materials. That ist respondent's view was
that ·appellant could put on no evidence calculated to explain the lien waivers. We believe this defines the issues.
We shall assume that the trial court granted the nonsuit
on all issues4
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I

RESPONDENT BY ITS CONlDUCT WAIVED THE
(X)NTRAGr REQillREMENT THAT ADDITIONS OR
DELETIONS IN THE ldA.TERIALS TO BE FURNISHED
\VERE TO BE MADE IN \VRITING~ OR IT IS ES.
TOPPED TO SO ASSERT, AND EVIDENCE ON THIS
POINT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PAROLE EVIDENCE
RULE .

POINT II
RESPONDENTtS AGENT~ C. E. SLAVENS~ HAD
ACTUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO WAIVE, AL.TER OR CHANGE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONTRACTS.

POINT III
THlE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS ARE FOR THE DELIVERY OF SPECIFIED AMOUNTS OF NAMED MATERIALS AKD EVIDENCE OFFERED AND ADI\IITTED TO SHOW OTHERWISE VIOLATES TilE PAROLE
EVIDENCE RULE.
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POINT IV
THE LIEN WAIVERS, FOR PURPOSES OF TinS
ACI'ION, ARE IviERE RECEIPTS AND EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE. MAY PROPERLY BE ADMI'ITED IN EX..
PLANATION THEREOF~

ARGUMENT
POINT I

RESPONDENT BY ITS CONDUCT WAIVED TIIE
CONTRACT REQUIREMENT THAT ADDITIONS OR
DELETIONS IN THE MATERIALS TO BE FURNISHED
~ TO BE MADE IN WRITING, OR IT IS ESTOPPED TO SO ASSERT~ AND EVIDENCE ON TillS
POINT DOFS NOT VIOLATE THE PAROLE EVIDENCE
RULE.

As is shown in argument under Point II of this brief,
appellant dealt with the 'COrporate respondent solely through
its agentt C. E. Slavens. The authority of this gentlemen
will be assumed for purpose of argument under this point.
Concerning parole modifications in 'Written contracts
requl.ring tftlat changes be 1n writingt the American Law
Institute, Restatement of the Lal\" of Contracts. ·Section
407 ~ states:
The fact that an agreement to rescind or modify
a prior contract is oral does not render it inoperative
e~t in the cases and to the extent that a Statute of
Frauds requiresj under the rules stated in sections 222224, whether the prior contract is oral or is in a sealed
'

or

1

unsealed \Vriting. ''

Comment (a) nnder this section states in part:

'•When·
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ever two persons contract, no limitations self-imposed can
dest1·oy their power to contract again.'' We believe this is
good la \\~ and that it prevails in this jurisdiction. Salzner v.
Jos. G. Snell Estate Corp.t 81 Utah 111~ 16 P. 2d 9284
The contracts (Exh4 6-11) contain

es~ntially

the same

provision:
1
'

It is mutually agreed that any additions or de-

letions in the materials to be furnished are to be given
m vniting by Party of the Second Part to the First
Party, and the value of the changesp based upon prices
quoted in the at. t.c.u:heu lists, shall either be added or
subtracted from the original contract. t,

When appellant learned that more and different materials were being ordered and delivered than v.ras providoo
in the materials lists as parts of the contracts, he immediately contacted the superintendent of respondent, Mr. C.
E. Slavens (Tr~ 351-3). \\,.e quote from the record:
In July of 1957, you say you sent a statment
to Payne & Day, Inc., through Mr. Slavens?
A~
We sent it to Mr. Slavens~ addressed to Payne
and Day, yes.
Q. I show you what is 1narked as Plaintiffs Exhibit 19 and ask you if that is the statement which was
'~Q.

~nt?

That is the one that was sent, yes.
Q. And in response to that biUingt did you have
nny conversation with JVh\ Slavens?
A. j\1r. Slavens carne in the office.
A.

(Objection and argument}
Q~

""A...

Q.

Where did it take place?
In o.u r office.
Who \Vas present?
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A. Mrs. Davis, myselfJ and I am not sure whether
Clyde was there or not.
Q. Tell us what was said by Mr. Slavens and what
was said by you and any other persons ·participating
in the conversation~
(Objections and argument)
A. Mr. Slavens ~brought in the invoice with him.
Q. You are referring to the exhibit?
A Exhibit 19.. Ylhen he came in,. he showed it
tn me. He said~ ''John, if you send that to Payne and
DayJ they would not have anything to do with it, they
would not know what the contract is and if you send
them ta them~ it will ball them up. What we want to
do is koop a record.'' How nice it would be, he suggested, a little record kept day by day and at the completion of the job, we would go through and take the
creclits and debits and come up with the difference and
he would get a oheck and that is the reason Payne and
Day was not billed by the month~'~
See also Transcript of Trial, 28-29~ 304·5.

Appellant, when he discovered additional and different
materials were being ordered, attempted to get in touch
with the corporate officers~ but without success (Tr. 299,
340). He was then assured by Mr. Slavens that the latter
had the authority, unless Payne called Davis, and that ev ..
erything was '•okeh.t~ TrueJ the trial court ordered this
stricken, on the theory that it was an attempt to prove
agency by the declarations of the agent We submit that
this was e.ITOr, as the agency of Slave-ns was never in dispute~ only the extent of his authority as agent This is
treated with authorities in Point II..
After the contracts, with material lis~ were entered
into, the plans of the houses were changed (Tr.. 61) . Two
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houses \Ve're increased in size without notice to appellant
(Tr. 199~ 201, 350). Porch oolwnn.s, a su·bstantial item not
on the contract material lists, and not shown on planst were
added by :vir. Payne and Mr. Day and provided by appe1lant. at Mr.. Slavens' order ( Tr. 186-7) . WindO\V sills also
were added (Tr~ 187). Slavenst who had an immediate
interest in keeping the prices dCAVn (See Exh/s 20-22) even
priced the cost of adding porch columns and passed this in·
formation on to Mr. Payne and I\lr. Day (Tr.. 187).
Many items were simply 'forgotten'' by Mrr Slavens
when he dra\v the material lists, part of the contracts. Roof. .
ing felt was used for subfloors in kitchens, baths and ga-b1e
ends of all frame housest on order of Slavenst though it
was not on the material Hsts (Tr. 166)

Wa1ls of the houses
were of sheetrock substantial quantities of sheet rock nails
\Vere ordered from appellant, yet these were left out in the
material lists because Slavens Hforgot" (Tr. 193).. The
same is true of rabetted \Vindow sills (Tr. 181)
robinet
hinges (Tr. 193) door hinges (Tr. 195), though these were
on the original plans and specifications, prepared by Slavensr Exhi~bit 23 sho\VS what Slavens considered as reQllired to enlarge the two houses after commencement of
the project and the execution of the contracts by appellants.
This shows su:bstantial additiona'l materialsj but appellant
knew nothing of the enla 1·g t7ment until after the fact, when
4

1

t

t

respondent ran o"Ut of roofing material (Tr. 80) ~ After construction was under way respondent had difficulties \Vi.th
F~H~A. and was required to u-se additional steel in footings
(Tr. 229ff) ~
The trial court steadfastly refused to allow appellant
lo testify to a conversation with Mr. Slavens \Vhen appellant learned of the use oi additional and different materials~
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in. which Slavens assured appellant that a Vlritten change
order would not be required (See opening statement, Tr. 6-7}. The court~s reason stated was that we were attepting
to prove agency by declarations of the agent. This~ we
submit~ was error. Our attempt was to show the extent
of authority of an admitted agent~ and testimony sought
was part of the res gest.ae. Slavens, respondent's agmt,
who profited with respondent by seeing that appellant
was not paid for extras and overages, did~ h&..Vever, admit
such conversation (Tr. 224).
The project. was a large one-to build sixty-one houses
in one season. We respec1Ifully submit that the entire record shows one concern only on part of respondent, to get
the job done. That it paid no attention to the contract re-quirement in issue. That it, through its agent, simply ordered and picked up additional materials as needed, as con ..
struction progressed and as changes in plans were made,

and that it thereby waived~ or is estopped to assert,. the
contract requirement that changes in material lists be made
in lVriting. See Salzner v.. Jos.. G.. Snell Esta.te Corp.. t 81 Utah
111~ 16 P. 2d 928; Fra.nk T. Hickey v. Los Angeles Jewish
Community Councilt et al, 276 P. 2d 52, ...... Cal ....... ;
Si tkin et al v. Smith et al, 276 Pac. 521~
~Ariz. . _.
The record is replete with objections and arguments
that the admission of testimony concerning transactions
and conversations foUowing the entry into the contracts
and during construction was violative of the parole -evidence
rule.. That rule precludes extrinsic evidence of transactions
pri.o.r to or oontemporanous with execution of an unambig·
uous written contract, intended to vary its terms. We sub·
mit that we offered no such evidence~ though, as argued un·
der Point III of this brief, respondent did just that. \Ve
r

•

•

•

•
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have consistently admitted the delivery of and payment for
the materials listed in the "\Vritten contract, and make no
claim therefor. We continue to maintain that a provision
of those written contracts was waived, or that a separate
and distinct contract or contracts were made, or that respondent~ by its conduct-. is estopped to deny othenvise,
and that appellant is entitled to payment for overages and
extras ordered by respondent.
POINT II
RESPONDENT~S

AGENT~

C. E. SLAVENS, HAD
ACTIJAL OR APPARENT AU'TIIORITY TO WAIVE~ ALTER OR CHANGE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONTRACTS.
Numerous and lengthy were arguments on the trial
that Slavens ·held a position of.limited authority!' which did
not extend to waiving a provision of the written contract,
or ordering additional or different materials. He was called
''constiu-ction superintendent,'' whtcht it ·seems was alone
considerro as such limitation~ His contracts of employment (Exh~'s 20~ 21j 22) were introouced to shmv such limitation~ which~ we submit~ they do not.
Appellant and his agents dealt solely with the corporate agent Slavensj and never with the o.ffieers~ Payne o-r·
Day (Tr. 77~ 79t 100-102, 103-104~ 114, 120-21~ 147-149~
283-4). Slavens drew the contracts between appellant and
respondent (Tr. 388). Slavens drew or had drawn the plans
and specifications for the houses ( Tr. 426-'Xl) , but these
\Ve-r-e not made availalll~ to appellant prior to his bidding
and signing the material contracts (Tr. 80, 178). Slavens
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prepared the ·material listst part of the written contract.s
(Tr. 178). (See also Tr. 426ff).
Alppellant was never informed of Slavens, contracts of
employment or any limitation on his authority (Tr. 425-6).
These contracts (Exh.js 20-22) bear examination. They
recite that Slavens, called the General Construction SuperintendentJ His experienced in the building of houses and in
preparing the initial building program and construction
estimates for the construction of numerous ~houses. '' They
then provide that ·he will proceed to over_se.e and supervise
construction of the houses, but will not devote his full time
the-reto.. He '"agrees to proceed expeditiously, in a workmanlike manner, to com-plete the construction'J of the houses.. A detailed statement of his compensation is then spelled
out, followed by the most interesting provision-that he
will participate to the amount of half the savings to the
extent he can hold the prices of the houses below a named
~he was to share in the profit made by keeping subcontractors' and

materiahnen~s

payments

dc:wm.~

Nothing

further appears defining or limiting his authority~ or granting him the authority he proceeded to assume~

On his own testimony, Slavens drew or provided the
plans~ prepared the material lists, dre\V the contracts with
subcontractors, negotiated the contracts, supeiVised construction, delivered the payments, prepared the lien waivers
and collected them '"- hen signed~ and generally ~"ran the
show/' (Tr. 428-30). We quote the record {Tr. 431):
01

"Q.

As a matter of fact~

you (Slavens) did all of

the dealings in connection with this project with Mr.
Davis on behalf of Payne and Day, did you not?
A. So far as I know, yes~
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Because you were in charge of the entire project~ were you not?
A. I was construction superintendent.
Q. Of the entire project?
A. Of the entire project~ yes4
Q. And your job was to get the houses built!
Q.

A.

Yes."~

As a matter of fact, Slavens was at appeUant•s -place
of business almost daily (Tr. 197, 221), at which time he
would pi-ck up or order materials (Tr. 79~ 259).
During direct examination of appellantt we Wldertook
to show that the agent, Slavens, made representations to
appellant as to the extent of his authority4 When appel-

lant Davis learned that two houses had been increased in
size after he had contraeted with respondent~ he endeavored
to get in touch with Mr. Payne or Mr~ Day. We quote from
the transcript (Tr. 299) :

"Q. (The Court) You say you called Mr. Payne
for the purpose to see who \Vas authorizing the bigger
house?
A.
Q.

And to get authorization.
(By :Mr. Ivins) to go ahead?

Q. (By Mr. Ivins)
Payne?

Did you get ahold of Mr.

A. No.
Q. Why did you disconti-nue trying to get ahold
of him?

A.

Mr4 Slavens told me) J.~r have the complete authority to go ahead~ If Mr~ Payne don't get in touch
\Vi.th you in an hour, you can figure everything is
okey.t,

Q. Did he get
A~

in touch with you?

I never heard from

l\11~ +

J;layne at all. t'
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The trial

ordered this stricken as an attempt to
prove extent of authority of the agent by his own stateCOW't

ment.

At the commencement of the transaction, appellant
began billing Payne & Day~ Inc. for extras and overages
(Tr.. 158). 1\1r. Slavens brooght the billing back to appel·
lant and a conversation was had between him and appellant, the substance of which the trial court refused to admit~ on the ground it was an attempt to prove agency by
tatements of the agent. A proffer of proof was made (Tr.
163) that :Mr. Slavens returned the billm.g, and instructed
appellant to keep track of the extras and overages lUltil
·oompletion of the project, at which time they w~d settle
up as Slavens had done on prior -projects~ for the reason
that billings as extras and overages were delivered would
confuse Mr. Payne and Mr~ Day.. See also Transcriptt 455457.
We respectfully submit that the trial rourt committed
error in excluding sucll evidence. There never was a ques~
tion but that Slavens was agent of the corporation. The
issue raised was the extent of his authority~ and appellant's
notice of any ·purported limitation~ We respectfully submit that such declarations of the agent were admissi·ble as
part of the res gestae--they were part of the act for which
he was agent of the corporate respondent. Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co. et aJ.t --·~-Utah
, 241 P. 2d 914;
2 1\-lecham on Agency (2d Ed.) p. 1353) Sec . 1780; I Jones
on· Evidence (4th Ed~) 487 ~ Sec.. 256; A. L~ I.. 1«-sta.tement
of the Law on Agency, Seer 284.
We re:spect.fu1ly submit that on these facts~ Slavens
had apparent authority to bind the co-rporate respondent~
either on a theory of waiver of the require1nent of the con-
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tracts that changes be in writing. on a theory that-the ex ..
tras and overages were in fact a new ·contractt in the nature
of an open aocowtt ~or a theory that the respondent prin. .
ciple is estopped to deny its agentts authority to bind it.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in the case of Union Century Life A~~urance Co. v. Glasscock, 110 SW 2d. 681 1 270
Ky. 750, 114 ALR 373, has stated well our position:
"If one ·puts another into, or knowingly permits
him to occupyt a JX)S.ition in which, according to the
ordinary experience and habits of mankind, it is usual
for the occupant to have authority of a particular kind~
anyone having occasion to deal with one in that posi lion is justified in inferring that the person in question possesses such authorityt Wlless the contrary is
then made knOWTI.''

See also 1 Me-eham on Agency (2d. Ed.) 174.. 178~ Sec.
241·245, and page 215, Sec. 298; A.. L. I. Restatement of the
Law of Agency Sec. 8 49, 50~ 141.
We believe the record shows that Slavens had actual
authority to thus waive the provisions of the contract and
bind his ·corporate principal for the extras and overages.
Appellant also had contracts with respondent for the roof ..
ing of the same sixty-one houses involved (Tr. 289) (Exh.'s
26-29) . Two of the houses were increased in size after
appellant had executed t..l-te contracts in issue~ necessitating more roofing materialst \Vhich were ordered orally by
Slavens, without written an1endment to the contracts. The·
1

roofing was delivered by appellant. and \vas ·paid for by
Payne and Day, Inc. on Slavens' authority, still without
\\·Titten ordert though the contracts for roofing and those
for other materials were identical in requiring such writte'l1 authority {Tr. 289-294)
\Vhat more evidencej apart
+
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from an absolute admission by the corporation~ need one
have as to tlhe extent of Slavens~ authority?
POINT

m

THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS ARE FOR THE DE·
LIVERY OF SPECIFIED AMOUNTS OF N.A..MED MA·
TER!IALS AND EVIDENCE OFFERED AND ADMITTED TO SHOW OTHERWISE VIOLATES THE PAROL.~£

EVIDENCE RULE .

Throughout the bial counsel for res{Xlndent held forth
extensively on what he denominated the ''package'~ method
of bidding materials for houses.. Over our objectiont respondent was pennitted to go beyond the scope of our direct examination, and interrogate Slavens extensively on
his interpretation of the contract on this iXilitt (Tr. 289ft}.
It seems that according to his theory~ appellant was merely
to furnish all materials needed for the housest and that the
material listst part of the contracts~ are a sort of guide-a sort of norm, both as to kind and amount~ the only limitation being something in the nature of the ejusdem gen·
eris rule.. Appellant was not to provide materials for flooring, cement work, brick, painting, and the likeJ hut except
for that he was to deliver whatever Slavens and his prin. .
cipal wanted, though plans could be changed from day to
day~

Perhaps respondent was relying on what it considered
a practice of the trade~ If so, this is strange~ COWlsel for
respondent said, '~It is an expJanation of a system that was
used~ that we don't see used very often in the business.''
(Tr. 389). Slavens denied knowledge of its general use
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(Tr.. 433) . No evidence of business custom. or practice was
offered .
If it had been~ it 'vould be objectionab1e. We submit
that the contracts are plaint unambigu.ous~ and require no
explanation by extrinsic evidence4 Except for Exhj.bits 6
and 10 ~ the contracts provide that '~First Party (appellant)
agrees to furnish materials~' for the identified houses Has
per attached lists,' which become a part of this agreement.~'
Exhibits 6 and 10 add the following: "'It is Wlderstood that
this is an average price, and the fact is taken into consideration that scheme 2 has one more truss than the other
schemes, and that scheme 1 and 2 do not have 20x10x16
or 2 pieces 2x4x10 barge rafters L'lat are on the lists." That
is~ in those instances where there is a variation in construction from the genet"dl plan) this is covered in the contracts
themselves~

The lists are broken into two sections~ denominated
package 1 and package 2. The record shrnvs that package
1 was supposed to be what was required from appellant to
take the houses to an inspectic;.n stage, and package 2 \Va:;
supposed to be what was required from appellant to take
the houses to final inspecticm. The only other use of the
term package in the contracts is: ''It is understood that
delivery will be made and biUed by ilackage nrnnber per
attached lists~'~ ( en1phas.is added) That is, the term ''package~t \\'as used in the contract ·simply to control delivery and
bHling. We see no ambiguity,
The material lists specify fixed quantities of named
materials. Ap~llant did not conb·act to provide all materials needed to build the ·houses, or all materials needed to
brlng . them to ar.Ly inspection stage~ Had the materials
bc:-t: n des t.r{}yed,. stolen or o the1"\Vise disposed of after de~
j
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liveryJ that was no concern of appellant. We submit that
the contracts are clear and wtambiguous. No explanation
of what was meant was needed~ none should have been admitted, and the court erred in permitting Slavens to go on
extensively about his own peculiar -&'package~~ theory,
thought upt we suspect, after the fact. It was error to permit Slavens to testify as to his intentions.. Continental
Bank & Trust Co~ v Bybee et aL 6 Utah 2d. 98J 306 P2d. 773;
Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 P2d.
952; 2 Jones on E\idence (4th Ed.) 869~ Sec. 454J 460, 4626.

POINT IV
THE LIEN WAIVERS, FOR PURPOSES OF THIS
ACTION, ARE l\iERE RECEIPTS AND EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE MAY PROPERLY BE ADMITTED IN EXPLANATION TIIEREOF.
It is remembered that the contracts) Exhibits 6 to llt
contained material lists, setting forth specific quantities of
specific items:~ broken into two groups~ denominated package one and package two. These materials listed in the
written contracts were to be billed for according to this division. That is when the materials listed in what is called
package one were delivered, they were to be billed for as
a unit, and were to be paid for as such. This was follO"Ned,
and no question arises thereon.
1

At the time of payment lien waivers were signed by
appellants ( Exhi1bits 12~ 16) . These lien waivers were prepared by Mr. Slavens) and insisted on by him before payment, in order to continue "With the bank financing (Tr~
430-:11). Mr. Clyde Davis testified to executing these~ and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
e"<plained that they were for the materials 1isted on the
written con tracts only (Tr ~ 91) .

One of the grounds for· the motion far non..suit. was
that the appellant '~has receipted the defendant (respondent) as having been paid in full" (Tr. 478; R . 26). We
take it that this is based upon these lie-n waivers,
This is not a lien foreclOsure action.. It is brought to
re-cover for materials delivered for which appellant has not
been paid. The record amply shmvs that the overages and
extras were in fact deliveredt and that they were not paid
for. Davis has brought suit for the extras and overages,
and Slavens testified that appellant has been paid nothing
but the contract sums (Tr. 451). On motion for non-suit
these facts should be deemed true.. For ·purposes of this
action! the lien waivers are a receipt merely, and they are
explained as a receipt for the materials called for in the material lists, part of the "Wlitten contract-..~materials for
which we have never sought payment in this action. Most
of them recite: ~This Payment Covers Materialt Package
0ro. 1 (or No.· 2t as the case may be).'"' thus being expressly
restricted to the material lists~ although some recite merely: '~This Payment Covers Material~ Payment in Full.~' On
these latter it is noted that t11ere is only one lien release,
though the contract calls for delivery in t\vo separate packages~ to ~ bi11ed separa teiy.
We quote from 2 Jones on Evi<len!'e (4th Ed.) p. 936.
s~.

491:
HThe rule e-xcluding testimony which is offe-red
for the purpose of contradicting, varying or explaining
the terms of a \·__.~r itt en instrument may not be successfully invoked \V here the \vt·iting in dispute· constitutes
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a mere receipt which does not em;body or set forth the
term.s of a contract~.,
This court has so held in the case of Brixen v. Jorgen.
sen et at, 33 Utah 97, 92 Pac. 1004, wherein it was held
that the contract to sell realty, in so far as it recited the
amount remaining tmpaid upon its execution, was only a
receipt~ and that parole vidence was admissible to show
that the amOW1t actually received was less than that stated
If the trial court relied on these lien leases as the basis
for the non,.suit, we respectfully submit that it committed

error.
CONCLUSION
On the record as it now stands there can be no question but that appellant delivered to respondent materials
m addition to and different from that called for in the contracts, to the value of 87J751.79~ for which he bas not been
paid. He did so in gCXMi faith. on the representations of the
only agent of respondent with whom he ever dealt that he
would be paid.

Apparently no one gave any attention to the provision
in the contract that changes must be in writing. Plans
were changed from time to time~ as the occasion aroset without consulting or even informing appellant Because of the
manner of delivery in bulkt 'With numerous hol.l.SeS going
up at once, appellant had no way of kno\ving what was being used until after the faet.
We submit that the corporate agent Slavens had actual authority to waive the provisions requiring written chan..
ges in rna teria:l 1ists, that if he did not:P the corporation, by
placing hi·m in full corrunand~ clothed him with apparent
authortty, that he by his declarations and conduct waived
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the requirementt and that the corporation is estopped to
deny such fact. The corporation entered into a profit
sharing arrangement with Slavens and hlrned him loose
to hold payments to those in appellant's position to a mini.mtuiL It does not nO'W lie in the corporate mouth to deny
his acts. It is unconscionable that the corporation thus
profit. We respectfully submit that the trial court erred
in granting the non-suit~ and should be reversed.

Respectfully submittetl,

ALLEN B. SORENSEN)" for
YOUNG. YOUNG & SORENSEN
Attorneys for Alppellant
227 North University Avenuej
Provo, Utah
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